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Abstract—The security of Industrial Control Systems (ICS)
has been attracting increased attention over the past years,
following the discovery of real threats targeting industrial en-
vironments. Despite this attention, automation of the reverse
engineering process of ICS binaries for programmable logic
controllers remains an open problem, mainly due to the use of
proprietary compilers by ICS vendors. Such automation could be
a double-edged sword; on the one hand it could accelerate digital
forensic investigations and incident response actions, while on the
other hand it could enable dynamic generation of malicious ICS
payloads. In this work, we propose a structured methodology
that automates the reverse engineering process for ICS binaries
taking into account their unique domain-specific characteristics.
We apply this methodology to develop the modular Industrial
Control Systems Reverse Engineering Framework (ICSREF), and
instantiate ICSREF modules for reversing binaries compiled with
CODESYS, a widely used software stack and compiler for PLCs.
To evaluate our framework we create a database of samples by
collecting real PLC binaries from public code repositories, as well
as developing binaries in-house. Our results demonstrate that IC-
SREF can successfully handle diverse PLC binaries from varied
industry sectors, irrespective of the programming language used.
Furthermore, we deploy ICSREF on a commercial smartphone
which orchestrates and launches a completely automated process-
aware attack against a chemical process testbed. This example of
dynamic payload generation showcases how ICSREF can enable
sophisticated attacks without any prior knowledge.
I. INTRODUCTION
Industrial Control Systems (ICS) are systems used to con-
trol, monitor, and interconnect physical processes in industrial
settings. A wide variety of sectors rely heavily on ICS for
their operation; examples include the oil and gas industry, food
processing, electric power systems, and water treatment and
desalination facilities. As evident from these examples, ICS
often control national critical infrastructure. Any disruption to
their operation can have far-reaching consequences, ranging
from severe financial losses to environmental disasters, and
even loss of life [44].
Over the past years, threats originating from the cyber
domain have become potential sources of disruption for ICS,
following the discovery of real ICS cyberattacks [36]. The most
prominent example is Stuxnet, an attack against a uranium en-
richment facility in Iran in 2010 [13]. Other examples include
two attacks against the Ukrainian power grid, which led to
partial blackouts in 2015 and 2016 [28], [10], and an attack
against petrochemical safety systems in Saudi Arabia [22].
From a financial standpoint, the annual cumulative losses of
cyber incidents for large ICS companies can be in the range of
$500,000 USD [23]. Correspondingly, the global ICS security
market is expected to grow from $10.24 billion USD in 2017
to $13.88 billion USD by 2022 [29].
The main enabler of this new class of attacks is the ongoing
convergence between Operational Technology (OT) and In-
formation Technology (IT). To reduce costs, Commercial-Off-
The-Shelf (COTS) components are increasingly being used in
ICS hardware and software. At the same time, ICS components
are being ubiquitously interconnected for increased situational
awareness, better control, and enhanced efficiency. Despite
the many benefits of the IT/OT convergence, an unwanted
side-effect is the exposure of ICS environments to the same
cybersecurity risks that plague the IT domain. As recent ICS
attacks demonstrate, attackers are taking advantage of the
expanded ICS threat landscape during this transitional period,
whereas defenders appear to be lagging behind.
ICS control physical processes through Programmable
Logic Controllers (PLCs). Process engineers program these
controllers by developing code which is compiled to a binary
that controls the target PLC. An important objective, both for
actors who wish to protect, as well as actors who wish to
attack ICS processes, is to automatically reverse engineer PLC
binaries. On the one hand, such capability could speed up
actions after an ICS cyberattack. Digital Forensics and Incident
Response (DFIR) teams could leverage automated reverse
engineering to understand attack objectives of PLC malware,
and timely deploy countermeasures. On the other hand, ICS
malware designers could leverage the same capabilities for
dynamic payloads that do not require communication with
a Command and Control (C2) center, enabling sophisticated
attacks even against targets that reside in air-gapped networks.
To date, to the best of our knowledge, the problem of
automatically reverse engineering ICS PLC binaries remains
an open problem [30], [26]. ICS binary reverse engineering
remains a tedious manual procedure carried out by domain
expert reverse engineers that are extensively familiar with
the systems under study. Recent academic literature on ICS
security also highlights that automated reverse engineering is
an important, unsolved problem; authors either make over-
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simplifying assumptions regarding the binaries of interest, or
assume that information for the physical process is obtained
utilizing other means (e.g., espionage) [14], [2], [31], [15],
[49]. In addition, the tools, frameworks, and techniques for
reverse engineering binaries (e.g., the Interactive Disassembler
— IDA Pro) in the IT world do not directly translate to the OT
world [34]. One of the reasons is that ICS vendors typically
employ proprietary and/or not well-documented compilers for
generating binaries for their target PLCs; Siemens PLCs are
programmed with the SIMATIC STEP 7, Allen-Bradley PLCs
with the Studio 5000 Logix Designer and the majority of other
ICS vendors employ the CODESYS framework.
Identifying the gap in methodological approaches, as well
as the lack of frameworks and tools specifically tailored to
PLC, in this paper we propose a methodology that considers
the unique characteristics of PLC binaries, and introduce the
Industrial Control Systems Reverse Engineering Framework
(ICSREF). ICSREF automates the reverse engineering process
for ICS binaries and can provide information on the physi-
cal characteristics of a system captured in the ICS binaries
controlling it, without any prior knowledge of the system.
Automated reverse engineering of PLC binaries can enable
a broad range of studies. On the one hand, the semantic-rich
information stemming from ICSREF analyses can be employed
for enhancing the security of ICS. A defensive use case that
highlights the need for fast, automated reverse engineering of
PLC binaries is PLC malware analysis. For example, imme-
diately after the discovery of Stuxnet, there was a pressing
need for reverse engineering the malicious STEP7 payload to
understand its impact on the nuclear plant it targeted. The
manual reverse engineering process carried out was arduous
and time consuming, delaying forensic investigations. Falliere,
who reverse engineered Stuxnet, subsequently created the JEB
decompiler for S7 PLCs, which automates the process and
expedites analysis of Siemens S7 PLC binaries [37]. Similarly,
ICSREF can be employed to analyze PLC malware that target
CODESYS-enabled PLCs, assisting DFIR professionals to
quickly determine the functionality and objectives of malicious
PLC binaries. When analyzing PLC malware, ICSREF can also
assist in PLC code authorship attribution by identifying mali-
cious actors through fingerprinting the code they utilize. In the
same way, ICSREF function and code snippet fingerprinting
can help legitimate actors prove IP copyright infringement by
their competitors. ICSREF analyses can additionally aid source
code recovery and binary code reuse in the case of legacy PLCs
for which the original source code is not available.
On the other hand, ICSREF highlights the significance
of adopting proper, proven security practices in ICS envi-
ronments. Automated reverse engineering can, for example,
enable dynamic process-aware payload generation, lowering
the requirements for malicious actors, and allowing sophis-
ticated attacks against air-gapped systems without requiring
prior knowledge.
Our contributions can be summarized as follows:
• We propose a structured methodology for reverse
engineering generic PLC binaries, which captures their
intricacies and unique characteristics.
• We develop ICSREF, a reverse engineering framework
for PLC binaries, which automatically analyzes bina-
ries created with the CODESYS platform and fully
reconstructs their Control Flow Graph (CFG).
• We collect and consolidate PLC source code and bina-
ries from public code repositories, creating a database
of samples for further studies.
• We carry out an end-to-end case study of dynamic
payload generation and attack deployment against a
chemical process. A commercial smartphone equipped
with ICSREF automatically generates and deploys the
attack, without any prior knowledge of the process.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In
Section II we provide background information on ICS and PLC
binaries, and identify their unique characteristics compared
to conventional binaries. We propose a structured reverse
engineering methodology specifically tailored to PLC bina-
ries in Section III. In Section IV we introduce the ICSREF
framework and present its technical details. Section V presents
our techniques and results for validating ICSREF correctness,
including the creation of a database of real binaries collected
from public code repositories, and a performance evalua-
tion of our framework. We demonstrate an end-to-end case
study of automated attack formulation and deployment from
a commercial smartphone enabled by ICSREF in Section VI.
We compare ICSREF with related work in Section VII, and
conclude the paper in Section VIII.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section we provide background information on ICS
environments and outline the unique characteristics of PLC
binaries1 compared to conventional binaries.
A. Industrial Control Systems
ICS is a broad term that encompasses various types
of configurations for controlling and monitoring industrial
processes. Such configurations include Supervisory Control
And Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems for geographically
dispersed systems, Decentralized Control Systems (DCS) for
large industrial processes with autonomous controllers, and
Process Control Systems (PCS) for small industrial settings.
ICS can be abstracted as a set of control algorithms that
operate on sets of measurement values obtained from the
physical environment via sensors. The results of these control
algorithms are in turn used to regulate the controlled physical
processes via actuators [35]. The process of sensing the
environment, calculating control signals and updating outputs
on actuators is also known as the scan cycle (left side of
Fig. 1), and is usually performed continuously and in a real-
time fashion by PLCs [44]. PLCs are real-time embedded
systems encased in ruggedized packages to withstand the harsh
industrial environments they are deployed into. They typically
include one or more microprocessors, volatile and non volatile
memories, analog and digital I/O subsystems, and networking
capabilities [34].
1In the context considered in this work, the term binary refers to executable
files, i.e., binary files that include native machine code that is executed by a
CPU with orchestration by an OS loader and/or a runtime process.
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Fig. 1. Software development for PLC and scan cycle.
B. Software development of PLC programs
The International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) de-
fines industry standards for PLCs in IEC 61131. More specif-
ically, the third part of the standard, IEC 61131-3, con-
cerns software architecture and programming of PLCs, in-
cluding programming languages, data types, variable attributes,
etc. [20]. IEC 61131-3 describes the following graphical and
textual programming languages for PLCs:
• Ladder Diagram (LD), graphical
• Structured Text (ST), textual
• Function Block Diagram (FBD), graphical
• Sequential Function Chart (SFC), graphical
• Instruction List (IL), textual (deprecated)
The PLC software development process is depicted in
Fig. 1. Process engineers develop PLC logic at engineering
workstations. The engineering workstations are equipped with
vendor-provided IEC 61131-3-compliant Integrated Develop-
ment Environments (IDEs) and compilers for the specific
PLC models used in the plant. PLC logic for controlling the
physical process is developed using one or more of the IEC
61131-3 languages listed above and is then compiled using
an IEC compiler. The binary is transferred to the PLC, a
procedure called program download in ICS terminology, where
a PLC runtime (a process executed by the PLC’s operating
system or firmware) handles the binary loading and execution,
enforcing the real-time requirements and enabling debugging
and monitoring of the PLC binary execution. During normal
operation the binary is loaded to the PLC’s fast, volatile
memory and executes from it. To ensure fast recovery in the
event of an outage, the PLC binary is also stored in non-volatile
memory, usually accompanied by retain/persistent variables
that conserve information regarding the state of the system.
From there, the PLC binary and the system execution state
can be automatically loaded upon PLC startup and resume
execution even after uncontrolled halts of the program.
C. PLC binaries vs. conventional binaries
Analyzing PLC binaries requires understanding their
unique domain-specific characteristics that differentiate them
from binaries targeting conventional workloads. Here, we
highlight the main differences between the two, and discuss
how these differences can facilitate or impede analyses.
Execution model: Besides differences in programming
paradigms, execution models between conventional and PLC
binaries are also different. Non-PLC languages, and by exten-
sion their compiled binaries, usually follow sequential execu-
tion of units of work (e.g., ;-delimited statements for the C
programming language [25]). On the contrary, the execution
model of PLC binaries is dictated by the scan cycle, infinitely
executing its three comprising steps. This can hinder dynamic
analyses on entire PLC binaries due to their infinite execution
nature, requiring that appropriate code sections are carved out
for individual dynamic analyses.
I/O operations: Although the majority of conventional bina-
ries rely on I/O operations to get input variables and produce
corresponding outputs, the importance of I/O operations for
PLC binaries is significantly higher. I/O operations in PLC
binaries are a critical and necessary part of their functionality,
occupying two thirds of the scan cycle. PLCs are by design
devices for interacting and controlling the physical world,
something that is achieved through sensor and actuator signals
via the PLC I/Os. It is thus necessary to identify the mecha-
nisms with which a PLC binary interacts and orchestrates read
and write operations to these I/Os.
File format: Binaries compiled for major Operating Systems
(OSs) usually follow well documented formats, for example
the Executable and Linkable Format (ELF) for Linux and the
Portable Executable (PE) format for Windows. These widely
used formats are handled by loaders of their respective OSs.
On the contrary, loading of PLC binaries is typically handled
by proprietary loaders (e.g., the CODESYS runtime [16]),
and the file format of PLC binaries is custom and unknown.
This impedes the analysis of PLC binaries, as these custom
proprietary formats need to be first reverse engineered to allow
further exploration.
Optimization: Due to requirements for provable enforcement
of real-time execution deadlines and assurances dictated by
various standards, compilers for PLC binaries typically only
make very conservative optimizations, if any [21]. On the
contrary, conventional binaries that do not control critical
environments typically employ several aggressive compiler
optimization techniques [3]. While this may lead to larger and
less efficient PLC executables, it can also facilitate reverse
engineering as they will be functionally simpler.
In general, these differences can be attributed to the
mission-specific nature of PLCs, as well as the long history
of industrial automation hardware and software that did not
always follow the progression of general purpose comput-
ers [17]. Any reverse engineering efforts should be informed
by these deviations from conventional binaries.
III. PROPOSED METHODOLOGY FOR REVERSE
ENGINEERING PLC BINARIES
In this section, we propose a structured overarching
methodology that is specifically tailored for reverse engineer-
ing PLC binaries. To date, several of the binary analysis
approaches and techniques proposed for arbitrary binaries
3
Fig. 2. Steps of platform-specific phase.
(e.g., function identification [4] and type inference [6]) can
be leveraged for individual subtasks of PLC binary analysis.
However, to the best of our knowledge, a systematic, structured
methodology that covers the entire reverse engineering process
for PLC binaries from start to finish is lacking. With our pro-
posed methodology we aim to address this gap, by identifying
the necessary steps and required outcomes.
When reverse engineering PLC binaries, both the similar-
ities and differences between conventional and PLC binaries
should inform the possible approaches, techniques, and tools.
Taking into account their unique properties and their nature,
we propose a structured methodology for enabling typical
automated reverse engineering tasks and objectives, consisting
of two phases:
1) A platform-specific phase, carried out once for each
platform (e.g., STEP7, Studio 5000, or CODESYS).
During this phase, we extract general information that
characterizes and applies to all the binaries generated
by that platform.
2) An automated binary analysis phase, carried out for
every binary. During the second phase, one must
automate the extraction of information from a PLC
binary, leveraging the platform-specific results.
A. Platform-specific phase
This phase aims to extract information concerning the
specifics of a platform. We break down this phase into two
steps: 1) reverse engineering and understanding the general
format of PLC binaries compiled with that platform, and 2)
creating knowledge databases, that contain general information
that can facilitate automated binary analyses. A schematic
representation of the platform-specific phase is presented in
Fig. 2. In general, this phase incurs a one-time cost per
platform, and requires a minimal instantiation of the platform
under analysis (i.e., a PLC device that uses this platform, and
its corresponding IDE to generate PLC binaries).
1) Binary format reverse engineering: The majority of ICS
platforms employ proprietary, undocumented binary formats
in their PLC binaries. Thus, the first step consists of under-
standing these formats and extracting relevant information.
Similar to widely used executable binary formats, PLC binaries
may include one or more headers, code and data sections,
symbol tables for dynamically linked code, etc. There are
no definitive methods for reverse engineering unknown file
formats, however reverse engineering techniques from domains
such as embedded systems firmware reverse engineering and
file format analysis can assist in this step [8], [41], [48],
[11]. In addition to the proprietary nature of PLC binary
formats, another impediment for this step is the execution
model of PLC binaries. Because of the infinite nature of the
scan cycle, dynamic analyses cannot be performed on the entire
PLC binary, but only on appropriately carved out instruction
sequences. Nevertheless, lack of optimizations in PLC binaries
may be beneficial for this step, as generalizations can be more
easily made due to the immutable compilation results.
In general, the results of the binary format reverse engi-
neering step should include information on header contents,
how subroutines are delimited, extraction of the subroutines
and their disassembly listings, identification of symbol tables
and dynamically linked functions, as well as information on
code and data sections.
2) Knowledge Databases: For the second step, we identify
the need for creating two knowledge databases containing
general information that enables and accelerates reverse engi-
neering tasks. The first should include information pertaining
to I/O operations performed in the binary, given their signifi-
cance for PLCs. This I/O information database should include
information on how a binary reads/writes from/to physical
I/Os. In the common case of memory-mapped peripherals, the
corresponding addresses for these I/O peripherals should be
identified and included in the database.
The second database should contain signatures of known
library functions and code snippets. These can fingerprint
known subroutines in arbitrary binaries, reducing the manual
effort required by a reverse engineer. This known functions
database should contain information pertaining to standard
functions and libraries that can be statically linked in the bi-
nary. Similar to typical programming paradigms, IEC 61131-3
programmers can import and utilize library Functions/Function
Blocks (F/FBs) in conjunction with their own F/FBs. Typical
examples include F/FBs that handle network communication
(e.g., MODBUS/SMTP stacks), common control algorithms
(e.g., PID), and timing functions (e.g., triggers, timers). Iden-
tifying and fingerprinting these functions can speed up the
analysis of a given binary, as the reverse engineer will not
have to spend time understanding already known functions.
A similar approach is employed by the commercial IDA
Pro disassembler with its F.L.I.R.T. technology [18]. The
corresponding knowledge database should employ a signature
scheme that ensures low false positive and false negative rates
when fingerprinting subroutines.
B. Automated binary analysis
The second phase automates the reverse engineering pro-
cess of arbitrary binaries. It assumes that binaries are devel-
oped using a known platform analyzed during the previous
phase. We identify a set of three necessary core steps for
performing automated analyses, and propose supplemental
steps that facilitate common reverse engineering tasks. Fig. 3
summarizes the requirements and components of this phase.
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Fig. 3. Steps of automated binary analysis (Prerequisites from platform-
specific phase in dotted lines).
The first core step should include the dissection of the
binary to its comprising components, leveraging the binary
file format information from the previous phase. In this step,
all subroutines must be delimited and disassembled, and
code/data section and symbol tables describing dynamically
linked functions identified. The second core step concerns the
reconstruction of an as complete and as sound as possible
CFG, by finding and resolving the targets of branches. We
use the definition of recovered CFG soundness and complete-
ness from [39]. Finally, the third core step should identify
instructions resulting to I/O operations and fingerprint known
functions, utilizing the knowledge databases.
Supplemental steps can augment the resulting analysis and
allow further automation. For example, a supplemental step
concerns the automated extraction of arguments passed to
function calls, using dynamic binary analysis techniques and
symbolic execution [39]. This step can be leveraged to extract
semantic information regarding the physical environment that
a PLC binary is controlling, as this is captured by the binary.
It can also assist in recovering lost source code, re-engineering
and reuse of code and intellectual property audits [12], [47].
Another supplemental step considers modification of binaries.
This enables dynamic payload generation [30], or injection
of host-based defenses [7]. Binary modification should also
take into account any file integrity mechanisms, such as CRC
checks [43]. A further step should provide intuitive representa-
tion of results, including CFG visualization. In our implemen-
tation of ICSREF we implement all these supplemental steps,
as described in the following section.
The structured methodology we describe in this section
is general, as it is designed taking into account vendor-
independent characteristics of PLC binaries. As such, it can be
followed for reverse engineering of PLC binaries irrespective
of development platform.
IV. THE ICSREF FRAMEWORK
In this section we present the technical details of the
Industrial Control Systems Reverse Engineering Framework
(ICSREF), our novel modular automated reverse engineering
framework. Applying our proposed methodology, we instan-
tiate ICSREF modules that can carry out automated analyses
TABLE I. AUTOMATION PLATFORMS OF ICS VENDORS
Company Development platform CODESYS-based?
Rockwell Automation Studio 5000 Logix Designer No
Siemens STEP7 No
ABB Automation Builder Yes
Schneider Electric SoMachine Yes
Bosch Rexroth Indralogic Yes
Wago Kontakttechnik WAGO-I/O-PRO Yes
Eaton Industries XSOFT-CODESYS Yes
Beckhoff Automation TwinCAT Yes
Lenze Automation PLC Designer Yes
Owen CODESYS Yes
Omron CX-One No
SEL acSELerator Yes
ifm electronic CODESYS Yes
STW Technic CODESYS Yes
Berghof Automation CODESYS Yes
for CODESYS-compiled binaries.2
CODESYS is a hardware-independent IEC 61131 platform
for industrial automation applications. We focus on CODESYS
because it is widely used; more than 250 manufacturers employ
it in their products, including multinational corporations with
substantial ICS market share [16]. The CODESYS Device
Directory lists 349 products or family of products that are pro-
grammed with CODESYS and are currently supported [1]. The
actual number of CODESYS-enabled devices is much larger as
several products no longer appear in the directory but are still
deployed. Table I lists software development platforms used by
major automation corporations, demonstrating the widespread
adoption of CODESYS. Due to the diverse categorization of
industries involved in automation (plant automation, trans-
portation, energy, process automation, building automation)
and the sparsity of published data regarding market share of
these companies, we do not have definitive data regarding
CODESYS market share. However, from our domain expertise
and discussions with experts, our conservative estimate is that
at least 20% of PLCs worldwide employ CODESYS.
A. Platform-specific phase: CODESYS
For the needs of the first phase, we begin by reverse
engineering known binaries towards understanding the binary
format of CODESYS PLC binaries. Subsequently, we lever-
age our findings to automatically create the two knowledge
databases containing PLC I/O memory maps, and known
library function signatures. We carry out these studies utilizing
a WAGO 750-881. The 750-881 employs an ARM micropro-
cessor and uses CODESYS v2.3. Regardless, we stress that the
results presented hereafter are not limited to binaries targeting
WAGO PLCs, but are applicable to any binary compiled with
CODESYS, irrespective of manufacturer.
1) Binary format reverse engineering: In understanding the
format used in CODESYS PLC binaries, we start by develop-
ing a small number of programs that perform simple tasks. For
this we utilize the CODESYS IDE, and write programs in all
available IEC 61131-3 languages. We compile the programs
for the ARM architecture employed by the WAGO 750-881,
obtaining the corresponding PLC binaries (the file extension
for WAGO CODESYS binaries is PRG). We focus on ARM
binaries because of the proliferation of ARM processors in
embedded systems deployed in ICS [33]. Preliminary inves-
tigations of binaries compiled for other architectures indicate
2Subsequent ICSREF releases will support additional platforms.
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Fig. 4. Left: Format (layout) of PRG binaries, Right: Structure of subroutines,
showcasing generic conventions.
TABLE II. HEADER INFORMATION
Offset Length Description
0x04 4 bytes Last global ASCII string
0x20 4 bytes Program entry point (-0x18)
0x2C 4 bytes Last code subroutine (-0x18)
0x30 4 bytes Size of stack
0x44 4 bytes Last dynamic library identifier
that the findings we describe in this section are representative
of overarching CODESYS compiler mechanics, and small
modifications suffice for extending ICSREF to other hardware
architectures. Subsequently, we examine and reverse engineer
these in-house generated PRG binaries. We disassemble the
binaries and spend a considerable amount of time comparing
their disassembly listings towards understanding the undoc-
umented CODESYS binary format and the various compiler
conventions. Fig. 4 summarizes our findings regarding binary
format and code subroutines structure.
Header: The first 80 bytes of a PRG binary constitute a header
that contains general information. Table II outlines the most
important information. For example, the value obtained by
adding 0x18 to the 4 byte value at offset 0x20 within the
header provides the program’s entry point. The resulting value
is the location of the Memory INIT subroutine. We note that
it is sufficient to only reverse engineer part of the header for
enabling automated analyses.
Subroutine delimiters: We pinpoint the entry and exit instruc-
tion sequences (i.e., subroutine prologue and epilogue) that can
delimit subroutines included in a binary. At the beginning of
subroutines, CODESYS-compiled binaries use the following
instructions:
MOV R12, SP
STMFD SP!, {R11, R12, LR}
MOV R11, R12
For exiting a subroutine the following instruction is used:
LDMDB R11, {R11, SP, PC}
An advantage stemming from the lack of optimizations in
PLC binaries, is that these delimiters are unique and universal
for all ARM CODESYS-compiled binaries. We subsequently
disassemble each subroutine and study its instructions in depth
to derive its functionality. Through this approach, we reverse
the entire PRG binary format, as shown in Fig. 4.
Initialization of global variables and generic subroutines:
The first subroutine (Global INIT) starts at offset 0x50,
following the header. This subroutine sets constants, variables,
and initializes functions defined in the VAR_GLOBAL section
of an IEC 61131-3 program. It is common practice for PLC
programmers to use this section for defining program-wide
constants regarding the physical environment under control
(e.g., scaling factors, PID gains, timing constants). After the
global initialization subroutine, we observe three short support
subroutines, present in every binary (Sub 1-3). They are
followed by a debugger handler subroutine (SYSDEBUG) that
enables extensive dynamic debugging from the IDE.
Statically linked libraries and user-defined Function
Blocks: The debugger handler is followed by subroutines for
imported library F/FBs. Each statically linked F/FB consists
of two subroutines: one that performs its main functionality
(StaticLibi), and one that initializes its local memory
(StaticLibi INIT). User-defined F/FBs that correspond
to code directly developed by a PLC programmer are placed
after the library F/FBs in a similar way: first a subroutine
that performs their main functionality (FBi), followed by
its initialization subroutine (FBi INIT). We also identify
the penultimate subroutine to be the main function, a user-
defined FB named PLC_PRG in CODESYS. This subroutine
is mandatory and serves as the starting point of the scan cycle.
Symbol table: Simple standard functions, such as mathe-
matical operations on REAL-typed variables, are dynamically
linked in CODESYS binaries. Information about these func-
tions is included in a symbol table, that is located after the
last code subroutine. The symbol table contains sets of null-
terminated string identifiers, followed by two bytes of data, as
follows:
DCB "real_add", 0
DCW 0x82
DCB "real_sub", 0
DCW 0x83
These two data bytes are used by the runtime to calculate the
jump offset required for calling the corresponding function.
2) CODESYS Knowledge Databases: Having understood
the file format and taking into account the unique charac-
teristics of PLC binaries, we proceed to the second step
with the creation of knowledge databases. To achieve this
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Fig. 5. I/O memory maps in CODESYS IDE.
we identify I/O operation mechanics for PRG binaries, and
construct fingerprints for identifying known functions.
I/O database: To communicate with the environment, the
physical I/O modules in CODESYS-enabled PLC devices are
memory mapped to specific addresses within the memory
space of a PLC. These are visible in the CODESYS v2.3 IDE
during creation of a new project, as seen in Fig. 5. For example,
in the case of the WAGO 750-881 PLC, whenever a memory
load operation in the binary reads from a memory address
within the range 0x28CFEC00 - 0x28CFF7F8 it essentially
queries a sensor, and whenever a memory store operation
writes in the range 0x28CFD800 - 0x28CFE3F8 it updates
an actuator.
Manually extracting the values for every target PLC pro-
gram from the CODESYS IDE is tedious and does not scale.
By inspecting the IDE installation, we find that all architecture
options for each PLC hardware are contained in target (TRG)
files, residing in the installation directory of the IDE. These
are data files that do not contain readable information, leading
us to suspect they are encoded and/or compressed. Indeed,
by further investigating the TRG file format and performing
a comparative analysis of different TRG files we identify
the encoding scheme used. In particular, the scheme employs
exclusive disjunction (XOR) between 2048-bit blocks of the
file contents and a reused 2048-bit fixed sequence. We further
verified that the same scheme and sequence are used for all
TRG files, irrespective of vendor and the target PLC, i.e., the
technique applies to non-WAGO PLCs. This allows us to parse
TRG files and extract the I/O memory maps for PLC models,
populating the I/O database in an automated manner.
Known functions database: We create fingerprints for the
statically linked library functions armed with our knowledge
of the PLC binary format from the previous step. The signature
scheme we select for uniquely identifying each subroutine
consists of the SHA-256 hash digest of the concatenated
sequence of its opcode mnemonics. We select opcodes and
discard instruction arguments, because the arguments may
contain mutable information (e.g., absolute branch targets,
usage of different registers). As we verified in our experiments,
the sequence of opcodes defines the functionality of the
subroutine, i.e., the opcode sequence of a library subroutine
is unique for each of our library F/FBs, and are not affected
by the minimal compilation options offered by CODESYS.
We populate the known functions database with signatures
for all known library F/FBs efficiently by automating all
the necessary operations. Our automated database population
Fig. 6. Left: Fingerprint used to form function signatures, Right: Process of
creating the known functions database.
workflow generates source code that only includes a call to one
F/FB, imports the code and its requirements to the CODESYS
IDE, and compiles it to obtain the corresponding PRG binary.
We analyze each binary to extract the signature of the F/FB
it contains, and append this signature to our database. The
function fingerprint and the overall procedure for creating the
known functions database is depicted in Fig. 6.
In total, we analyze and create signatures for all 1704
F/FBs included in the 212 libraries that are available in our
CODESYS IDE instantiation. The total time required for the
automated process was 11 hours and 44 minutes. Although
this is a time-consuming step, it is a one-time cost. After
the database is created, fingerprinting subroutines in any given
PRG binary resolves to a fast query of the database. During our
database construction we did not find any collisions between
F/FBs that perform different operations, demonstrating the
suitability of using opcode sequences as identifiers. In addition,
by automating this process we can easily extend the database
to include F/FBs signatures from new libraries.
B. Automated binary analysis: ICSREF
We incorporate the knowledge we extract from the
CODESYS platform-specific phase, as well as the automated
binary analysis steps into ICSREF. ICSREF can automatically
reverse engineer PRG binaries, containing modules to carry
out all the steps for the second phase as they are outlined in
the methodology section. Our design goals for ICSREF are:
• Accuracy: The results obtained by applying ICSREF
to a PLC binary should be accurate, including full
CFG reconstruction whenever possible.
• Extensibility: ICSREF design and structure should
enable easy extension to new PLC targets, microar-
chitectures, and IEC 61131-3 development platforms.
• Usability: Usage of ICSREF should be easy, and
provide an intuitive interface to the reverse engineer.
To achieve these design goals we follow a modular ap-
proach, where a core module handles the core steps of the
7
second phase. Supplemental modules extend the results, pro-
viding visualization, function call argument extraction, and
binary modifications.
1) Core module: This module processes arbitrary PRG
binaries by carrying out the core steps of the automated binary
analysis, namely binary dissection, CFG reconstruction, and
identification of I/O operations and known functions.
Comprising components: To dissect a PRG binary, the core
module leverages the PRG binary format information from
the previous phase. First, it parses the header and extracts
the information it contains. It then scans the binary searching
for subroutine delimiters, and uses them to carve out all
the subroutines and generate their disassembly listings using
radare2. Finally, it extracts the symbol table and identifies
any dynamically linked functions.
CFG reconstruction: For every binary analysis, automated
or not, it is of utmost importance to reconstruct its CFG.
This includes resolving the branches that are both within each
subroutine, as well as jumps from one subroutine to another. A
fundamental challenge that can hinder full CFG reconstruction
is resolution of indirect branch targets [39]. Fortunately, as we
explain below, PRG binaries only contain indirect jumps for
calls from one subroutine to another or to a dynamically linked
function, and the locations of all such indirect branch targets
are completely self contained in the binary. Essentially, we can
extract and resolve all indirect branches, resulting in a fully
reconstructed CFG graph. This is a byproduct of the strict
requirements and standards that govern ICS platforms; lack of
optimizations avoids complicated control flow operations, and
provable real-time deadlines drive compilers to avoid runtime-
resolved indirect jumps.
By observing the internal structure of subroutines (see right
side of Fig. 4), we identify the instructions that orchestrate
indirect jumps for calls from one subroutine to another or to
a dynamically linked function to be the following:
STR Ri, [SP,#-4]!
STR LR, [SP,#-4]!
LDR Ri, =SUB_OFFSET
LDR Ri, [Ri]
MOV LR, PC
MOV PC, Ri
NOP
LDR LR, [SP],#4
LDR Ri, [SP],#4
Essentially, all jump targets (SUB_OFFSET) are contained
in a call table residing in memory. In CODESYS binaries, this
call table can be fully reconstructed. For dynamically linked
function targets, we identify the call table index values to be
calculated from the two byte data values following the null-
terminated strings within the dynamic library section. Specifi-
cally, the jump offset is calculated by multiplying the two byte
value of the null-terminated string identifier of a function by
4 and adding 8 to this result. For in-binary subroutine targets
(e.g., statically linked library F/FBs or user-defined F/FBs),
we identify that the call table is constructed by the CODESYS
runtime after execution of the last subroutine, namely Memory
INIT. The functionality of this subroutine, which is also the
entry point of the binary, is twofold. First, it zero-initializes the
memory space required by the binary. Second, it calculates the
index offsets necessary for calling all the subroutines included
in the binary, creating the corresponding call table.
We achieve extraction of the call table for in-binary subrou-
tine targets by leveraging the dynamic symbolic (and concolic)
execution capabilities of the angr framework [39], [42], [40].3
Symbolic execution allows us to execute specific parts of the
binary (in this case the Memory INIT subroutine) without
necessarily knowing the entire state of the target system,
and enables extensibility of ICSREF to other platforms. An
important challenge is that the loader of angr cannot handle
PRG format binaries. We overcome this challenge by manually
informing the analysis engine of the target architecture (in
this case ARM) and setting a custom entry point for the
binary at the beginning of the Memory INIT subroutine.
We also force the engine to halt once it reaches the exit
point of the subroutine to avoid state explosion. We then
parse the memory of the resulting symbolic state, extracting
all the indexes allocated for the binary’s subroutine offsets,
effectively reconstructing the desired call table. Following
these techniques we can resolve all branch targets in any
arbitrary PRG binary, effectively reconstructing a 100% sound
and complete CFG.
I/O operations and known functions matching: We employ
the I/O operation database to identify the instructions that
result to reads/writes from/to physical I/Os. For this task, we
again perform symbolic execution with angr. In particular,
we execute each subroutine individually, detecting read/write
operations within the memory mapped I/Os ranges. We anno-
tate the reverse engineering results to reflect these operations,
assisting reverse engineers in identifying locations where the
binary interacts with the physical environment. For matching
in-binary subroutines to known library F/FBs, we calculate the
signature of each subroutine, and query the known functions
database for matches. Whenever there is a match, the name
of the subroutine is modified in ICSREF results to reflect its
functionality per its library definition.
2) Function call arguments module: A typical reverse
engineering step in dynamic analyses concerns extracting
arguments passed to subroutines at call locations. This can
aid in recovering lost source code, extract semantic-based
information regarding the physical environment of the PLC,
and allow process-aware dynamic payload generation. We
implement function call argument extraction in ICSREF by
developing a module that can extract the arguments passed
to Proportional-Integral-Derivative (PID) function blocks as a
proof-of-concept. The PID block as defined in the CODESYS
Utility library is depicted in Fig. 7. We identify that arguments
are passed to a subroutine on its local stack, and reconstruct
this stack using angr. Taking into account that the arguments
could be global variables/constants, we initially symbolically
execute the Global INIT subroutine, where these values
are defined and set. Subsequently, we transfer execution to
the caller subroutine and execute it until we reach a call to
a function of interest (in this case PID). Finally, we query
the resulting symbolic memory values on the local stack,
3angr is a python framework that combines static and dynamic symbolic
analysis.
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Fig. 7. PID block from CODESYS Utility library.
effectively extracting the arguments that get passed to the PID
function during its call. Although we develop an argument
extraction module for PID functions, this module can be easily
extended to extract the arguments of calls to any function for
which the list of parameters and their data type are known.
3) Binary modification module: Introducing modifications
to the binary under analysis enables a plethora of studies.
To that end, we develop a binary modification module for
ICSREF. This module enables overwriting the contents of any
location in a PLC binary (including both locations with code
and data contents), with new user-specified values. Example
uses include patching machine code instructions, changing
branch targets, injecting executable code by overwriting “dead
code”, and modifying the call arguments of critical functions,
as they are extracted with the respective module. This module
can also be used to introduce malicious modifications, enabling
less sophisticated actors to craft malicious PLC binaries. In the
interest of protecting critical infrastructure, although we will
release all ICSREF analysis modules, the binary modification
module will not be disclosed publicly.
To ensure that our modified PLC binaries are considered
valid by the hardware PLC, we also investigate any employed
file integrity mechanisms. In particular, CODESYS uses a
checksum file (CHK) to ensure the integrity of binaries. Thus,
to generate valid modified binaries we need to reverse engineer
this checksum algorithm. We achieve this by identifying the
checksum algorithm to be an addition of all the bytes in a
PRG binary, and incorporate CHK file generation in our binary
modification module.
4) Visualization module: We develop a visualization mod-
ule that provides intuitive representation of ICSREF results,
addressing our usability design goal. The resulting call graph
visualization after applying this module to a PLC binary is
shown in Fig. 8. The graph is created using the DOT graph
description language, where each subroutine and dynamically
linked function is a node, and calls between them are edges.
We add weights to the edges, representing the number of calls
from a caller subroutine to its callee. To differentiate between
code contained in the binary and dynamically linked code, we
use different colors for edges; for the former we use blue edges
and for the latter red edges. Naming of unknown nodes follows
the typical convention of sub_<OFFSET>, whereas nodes
identified by the known functions matching technique use their
library definition names to assist the reverse engineer. For each
node that is contained in the binary (i.e., not a dynamically
linked function), we also create a hyperlink in the final SVG
image that links from a node to its corresponding disassembly
listing for convenient traversal.
Considering our usability design goal, we develop all
ICSREF modules in Python 2.7 allowing them to execute on
cross-platform systems. The reverse engineer can also directly
interact with the analysis and its results from a terminal
interface created using the python cmd2 library.
V. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
To evaluate ICSREF both in terms of correctness as well
as performance we carry out extensive experiments. For our
experiments we utilize in-house PLC binaries and also collect
real PLC programs and binaries from public code repositories.
In this section, we present the experimental results of our
analyses and the details of the database of sample PLC
programs we create.
A. Correctness evaluation
We verify the correctness of the platform-specific phase for
CODESYS and the automated binary analysis phase by cross-
checking and validating the results of analyzing a given PLC
binary with ICSREF against its corresponding source code.
This comparison allows a complete test since the source code
that generated a binary under study is essentially a “golden
copy” that contains all the information needed to evaluate the
correctness of ICSREF results.
1) In-house binaries: We perform a preliminary evaluation
of the correctness of ICSREF using the 1704 PRG bina-
ries, which we generated for the known functions database
(see Section IV-A2). These binaries are excellent samples
for preliminary tests, as we have the source code for all
1704 binaries, and in addition, the binaries have a very rigid
structure, considering that they only include a call to one
library F/FB by construction. With this a priori knowledge we
analyze all binaries with ICSREF, inserting automatic checks
that compare the resulting CFGs with the expected CFGs
stemming from the known source code structure. In all cases,
ICSREF results matched the expected CFG, reconstructing a
100% complete and sound CFG. This provides a first validation
of the correctness of ICSREF results for rudimentary PRG
binaries.
Subsequently, we utilize in-house developed binaries to
evaluate ICSREF results when performing more complex anal-
yses on real programs. We again compare and verify the cor-
rectness of ICSREF results against the expected functionality
and CFG of the programs as it stems from their source code.
An example binary we use in this step is an IEC 61131-
3 ST program targeting a WAGO 750-881 PLC. The program
controls a small part of a chemical process, further described in
Section VI. It contains calls to two PID control functions that
execute in a fixed time interval (using PID_FIXCYCLE). The
program also employs a digital input that acts as a trigger using
rising edge detection (using R_TRIG) that orchestrates the
PLC program execution using an external signal. The resulting
graph of the ICSREF analysis as generated by the visualization
module is presented in Fig. 8.
To verify that ICSREF results are correct, we perform a
line-by-line comparison of the results against the program’s
source code, verifying that they match. Here, in the interest
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Fig. 8. Visualization of the call graph of a PLC binary that controls part of a chemical process using two PID controllers. Blue edges: Calls to statically linked
functions, Red edges: Calls to dynamically linked functions, Edge weights: # of calls
of space, we only focus on high level subroutines and their
calls. As we observe from Fig. 8, the nodes and their edges as
detected by ICSREF completely agree to the above description
of the program operations. The main PLC_PRG subroutine
calls the PID_FIXCYCLE function block twice, which in
turn calls the DERIVATIVE and INTEGRAL functions; note
that each call to PID_FIXCYCLE calls DERIVATIVE once
and INTEGRAL twice, something we derive by examining
the source code of PID_FIXCYCLE from its corresponding
library file. PLC_PRG also calls R_TRIG for detecting the
external triggering signal. The Global INIT subroutine ini-
tializes all the required subroutines. Several other dynamically
linked function calls are made from the main function and its
callees; these are either made by the imported library FBs for
performing their calculations, or carry out scaling/formatting
of environment values, something we verified by analyzing in
depth both the developed source code, as well as all imported
library F/FBs source code.
2) Binaries from public code repositories: In addition to
in-house developed binaries, we collect real programs and
binaries developed using CODESYS from online, public repos-
itories on GitHub. These programs are developed by different
authors, target various PLC devices, and control different,
disparate physical environments. This makes them particularly
appropriate for testing our framework, as their diversity can
rigorously test the correctness and generality of ICSREF.
Beyond ICSREF correctness evaluation, by collecting and
consolidating PLC programs and binaries we create a samples
database. Our database contains both the source code as well
as the corresponding binaries for industrial applications of
various complexities, enabling various studies by providing
a repository of diverse PLC programs. An immediate benefit
of our database is that it provides benchmark programs that
enable a thorough evaluation of methods and techniques that
operate at the source code level, the binary level, or in
between (as ICSREF does). We leverage this database for
exactly this purpose in this paper. Furthermore, our database
enables comparative studies with a common set of benchmark
programs, and provides useful and realistic PLC program
source code for educational purposes, lowering the entry bar
to PLC programming and process engineering.
We construct specific search queries using the GitHub
advanced search options to discover public code repositories
containing CODESYS source code project files. This is not
straightforward; while these files contain the source code
of PLC applications, they are non human-readable files. As
such, the GitHub search engine does not index them, and
it cannot perform searches within their contents. We over-
come this limitation by leveraging the auxiliary files that
support CODESYS project files (*.pro) in order to pinpoint
and collect our database samples. When developing a PLC
program with CODESYS, the IDE creates several auxiliary
files, such as compile information files, download/reference
files, initialization and log files, and symbol files. All these files
are non-text files, except the *.SYM symbol files. The symbol
files comprise of ASCII characters and contain information
regarding the version, project Id, checksum, and size of a
project. Since they are indexed by GitHub, we use keywords
present in these files (e.g., “ProjectId”), in combination with
a search for files with a SYM extension, and find the public
code repositories that contain CODESYS projects.
In total, we identify and download 471 CODESYS project
files from 127 repositories of 55 users across GitHub using the
search terms described above. For 69 out of the 471 project
files, the repositories also contained the corresponding PRG
binaries. By examining the strings contained in the project
files we extract the target PLC details, identifying the vendor
and target PLC model. Table III shows the target PLC device
vendors for the downloaded project files. From the table we
observe that the majority of programs (68%) are developed
for WAGO PLCs. This can be attributed to two factors. First,
WAGO PLCs are popular for small-to-medium installations
which are also more likely to share their process engineering
programs publicly. In contrast, large corporations employing
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TABLE III. TARGET PLC VENDORS FOR DOWNLOADED PROJECT FILES
Vendor Number of projects Number of authors
WAGO 320 19
BECKHOFF 71 16
OWEN 33 7
STW 24 1
CODESYS SoftPLC 7 5
ALTUS 7 2
TTCONTROL 2 1
ifm electronic 2 1
LENZE 1 1
Googol 1 1
FESTO 1 1
Bosch Rexroth 1 1
BERGHOF 1 1
Total 471
devices from other vendors are arguably much more protective
of their source code. As their code likely controls sensitive in-
dustrial deployments, making the code publicly available could
divulge corporate secrets and intellectual property. Second, 235
out of the 471 projects we downloaded belong to a single
organization, which provides software and control solutions
for the energy sector based on WAGO PLCs.
Inspection of the downloaded project files revealed that our
collection includes programs in all IEC 61131-3 languages,
for automation projects across several industries, including the
energy sector, building automation, automotive applications,
industrial deployments, robotics, etc. The diversity of these
programs strengthens the power of our database, both for
evaluating ICSREF, as well as for its use as benchmarks by
other researchers.
For evaluating the correctness of our framework, we open
the downloaded project files, import their library dependencies
if we have access to them, and finally compile them for the
target PLC, obtaining the corresponding PRG file. We then
pass the PRG binary to ICSREF for automatic analysis. For
this evaluation, our efforts are hindered by the fact that we
only have access to a CODESYS IDE for WAGO PLCs,
allowing us to only meaningfully compile programs developed
for WAGO PLCs. Another limitation is that some of the
programs require proprietary libraries that were not shared
along with the program source code. Without loss of generality,
for the above reasons we focus on compiled PRG binaries for
WAGO PLCs, and on the 69 precompiled binaries that target
PLCs from WAGO, OWEN, LENZE, and BERGHOF. After
discarding the non-useful programs that are either corrupted,
too simplistic, or non-functioning code stubs, we analyze 266
binaries with ICSREF.
Following the same approach as for in-house binaries, we
verify the correctness of ICSREF results by comparing them
against the expected functionality and CFG of the programs
as it stems from their source code. Due to the complexity of
the programs, their large number, and also the similarities we
observed between programs developed by the same users, we
rigorously compare ICSREF results versus the program source
code for one program from each user. Our results indicate that
similarly to the in-house binaries, ICSREF results matched the
expected CFG in all cases, reconstructing a 100% complete
and sound CFG. Interestingly, during this analysis we observed
that the number of subroutines contained in some binaries was
less than the number of F/FBs in the corresponding source
code. Our close examination revealed that this is the result of
rudimentary compiler optimizations, where the compiler strips
away code that is never called by the program.
B. Performance evaluation
An important requirement we set for ICSREF is that
it should be capable of handling PLC binaries of arbitrary
complexity and size. To assess the scalability and performance
of ICSREF we measure the time required by the different steps
of the analysis on our database of 266 PLC binaries.
We collect the timing results for all 266 binaries by
executing ICSREF on a machine equipped with an Intel i7-
7500U CPU and 16 GBs of RAM, running Ubuntu 16.04. The
measured times for analyzing binaries of different sizes and
varying complexity are presented in Fig. 9. The graphs depict
the time spent in executing the different operations of ICSREF
plotted against binary size. In particular, the graphs present
the time spent in: a) disassembling all binary subroutines
with radare2 in Fig. 9a, b) constructing the call table by
symbolically executing the Memory INIT subroutine with
angr in Fig. 9b, c) all other ICSREF operations in Fig. 9c, and
finally d) the total time required to analyze a binary in Fig. 9d.
From the plots in the figure, we observe that the time required
by ICSREF is dominated by operations performing subroutine
disassembly and call table construction. Taking an example
of an average sized binary of 310 KB, its total analysis time
was 58.1s, with disassembly requiring 16.0s (27.5%), call table
construction 41.4s (71.3%) and other operations 0.7s (1.2%).
Further analysis of the timing measurements allows us
to draw conclusions on the performance of ICSREF and its
consisting components. From Fig. 9a, we observe that the
subroutine disassembly time has a linear relationship with the
binary size. This is expected, since larger binaries contain
larger and more complex subroutines whose disassembly will
require more time. The time required by angr to symbolically
execute the Memory INIT subroutine, depicted in Fig. 9b, is
approximately constant, increasing slightly as the binary size
increases. For the 266 analyzed binaries, the average time spent
in this step is 38.26s with a standard deviation of 4.15s. This
is also expected since the Memory INIT stage follows the
same steps to initialize memory and construct the call table
irrespective of binary size. The slight increase is attributed to
the higher number of subroutines in larger programs, leading to
more entries in their call tables. All other operations, depicted
in Fig. 9c, require a small fraction of the overall time to
execute, and intuitively have a linear relationship with binary
size. The overall analysis time also has a linear dependency
with binary size as shown in Fig. 9d, with a slope that is the
aggregate of the slopes of its comprising operations.
The timing results demonstrate the scalability capabilities
of ICSREF for handling large-size binaries. In our experience,
even for complex cyber-physical systems containing hundreds
of functions, the size of a PLC binary is not more than 2000
KB (note that in our database of realistic binaries no program is
larger than 550 KB). Since the analysis cost is linear, ICSREF
would require less than 5 minutes for processing a 2000 KB
binary. This is acceptable, since the automated analysis is only
performed once for every binary.
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(a) radare2 time (b) angr time
(c) Other operations (d) Total time
Fig. 9. Experimental results of ICSREF performance evaluation.
VI. CASE-STUDY: AUTOMATED ATTACK FORMULATION
AND DEPLOYMENT
As mentioned above, the automated binary reverse en-
gineering capabilities of ICSREF enable a variety of novel
studies in the ICS domain. In this section, we carry out an end-
to-end case study that applies ICSREF analyses in a practical
scenario. In particular, we demonstrate how the automated re-
verse engineering capabilities of ICSREF can enable dynamic
payload generation for complex ICS environments, without
any prior information regarding the physical process and its
controllers [30].
Threat model: The threat model we consider in our case
study consists of two actors: an attack designer and an at-
tack deployer. We assume the attack designer has advanced
technical capabilities and designs and plans out the entire
attack, but does not have physical access to the target facility.
On the contrary, the attack deployer is assumed to have
physical access (e.g., is a low-level employee), but lacks the
technical skills for developing the attack. The deployer can be
manipulated or coerced to deploy the attack. Abiding to this
threat model, we consider that the attack designer bundles the
attack vector in an inconspicuous everyday device, such as a
smartphone, which they can hand over to the attack deployer.
The deployer will in turn introduce it in the target environment,
and execute the automated attack generation and deployment.
Fig. 10. Hardware-In-The-Loop testbed implementing the TE process.
Top: Host PC running simulation of TE process, Bottom right: WAGO PLC
connected to host PC over a serial interface, Bottom center: ICSREF-equipped
smartphone for automatically generating and delivering malicious payload.
For our case study, we characterize and deploy an end-
to-end automated exploitation attack vector, targeting a re-
alistic ICS process in a controlled environment. Our target
process is the Tennessee Eastman (TE) chemical process,
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Fig. 11. Automated attack chain carried out by smartphone. Red boxes:
network operations, Green box: ICSREF operations.
implemented using a modified version of the TE simulation
model from [38]. The Tennessee Eastman challenge process
is a realistic simulation of a chemical process, released to the
academic community as a benchmark process [9]. Since its
release it has been widely used in several process control and
ICS security studies [46], [24]. In our modified version of the
TE process, we incorporate real physical PLC devices that
handle certain control loops of the process and communicate
with the simulation environment. Specifically, we have devel-
oped a Hardware-In-The-Loop testbed, where a WAGO PLC
executes two of the 18 PID controllers of the model. Fig. 10
depicts our testbed experimental setup. The functionality of the
binary executing on the WAGO PLC was provided in detail in
Section V-A1.
To automatically attack the TE process, we deploy ICSREF
on a commercial smartphone per our threat model, and design
a simple “push the button” application. A smartphone is
an inconspicuous device and we assume it will not raise
any alarms when the deployer introduces it in the target
environment. The specific smartphone we employ is an LG
Google Nexus 5 running the Ubuntu Touch operating system.
The attack deployer only has to establish a wired or wireless
connection to the field network and launch the application.
Powered by the automated reverse engineering capabilities of
ICSREF, the smartphone can understand the structure of PLC
binaries, make inferences regarding the physical characteristics
of the controlled process, and generated modified binaries that
deploy meaningful and impactful attacks in an unsupervised
and autonomous manner.
In our experiments, we program the phone to automatically
carry out a sequence of steps, depicted in Fig. 11. In summary,
the phone scans the network for industrial devices, fingerprints
them, and downloads any binaries they contain, within ap-
proximately 90s. Subsequently, the binaries are automatically
analyzed with ICSREF, requiring an additional 250s. During
this step, ICSREF identifies whether the binaries contain any
PID functions, extracts their arguments, and changes them
accordingly, generating modified binaries. Finally, the modified
binaries are uploaded back to the PLC, and a soft reset
command forces the PLC to execute the malicious code. This
final step requires approximately 60s. Overall, the entire attack
chain is executed from start to finish in less than 5 minutes.
This demonstrates the feasibility of deploying context-aware
payloads without orchestration in short time windows and
using less powerful computing devices, such as smartphones.
Fig. 12. Reactor pressure before and after Kp payload.
As a proof-of-concept we instruct the phone to generate
payloads that introduce modifications that are contextually
meaningful. In particular, we deploy a payload that manip-
ulates PID functions, as these control primitives are among
the most commonly used algorithms in ICS. Our ICSREF
module that fingerprints known code snippets can identify
PID functions, and subsequently, the function call arguments
module can extract the numeric values passed to their calls.
Any argument passed to the PID function during its call can
be manipulated (e.g., setpoints, proportional/integral/derivative
gains, initial values, etc.). Without loss of generality, we choose
to alter the proportional gain (Kp) of the PID call that regulates
the plant’s reactor pressure, and increase it by a small constant
value, relative to its previously programmed value (which is
unknown to the phone and attacker in advance). To achieve
this, we extract the current Kp value with our function call
arguments module, and generate a new binary that modifies it
using the ICSREF binary modification module. The introduced
change causes the reactor pressure to stabilize at a lower
pressure setpoint (at around 2350 kPa) instead of the optimal
value of 2800 kPa. The impact on the reactor pressure is
shown in Fig. 12. Since this change does not cause any of
the measured variables to go off range it will not trigger any
alarms. However, lower reactor pressure has a negative impact
on the plant-wide performance and results in monetary losses.
We stress that for automatically generating payloads with-
out prior intelligence, it is necessary to have automated reverse
engineering capabilities such as the ones provided by ICSREF.
Without these, either prior knowledge regarding the binary,
or interaction with a C2 server are necessary, which both
render the attack more difficult and less likely to succeed.
With ICSREF, operational details of the plant can be extracted
from PLC binaries autonomously, and a view of the plant and
its characteristics can be reconstructed on-site enabling more
impactful attacks with less prerequisites.
VII. RELATED WORK
Among the several published works concerning the security
of industrial systems, the works of McLaughlin et al. [32],
[31] and Zonouz et al. [49] are closer to the work presented
in this paper. In particular, [32] presents a Trusted Safety
Verifier (TSV) for Allen-Bradley PLCs. TSV employs sym-
bolic execution and model checking to verify safety-critical
code that executes on a PLC. Extending this work, [49]
employs similar techniques to ensure that PLC code does
not violate any safety requirements. SABOT, automatically
generates payloads against PLCs by mapping PLC control
instructions to an adversary-provided behavioral specification
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of the target system [31]. All these approaches operate on the
Instruction List (IL) PLC code, which is an assembly-like IEC
61131-3 language and not native machine code that a CPU
directly executes (note that IL was deprecated in the third
revision of the IEC standard). In contrast, ICSREF does not
assume access to an IL version of the source code. Instead,
ICSREF operates directly on the native binary, which is always
present on the PLC executing it, enabling more realistic use
cases. Furthermore, all 3 approaches assume full or partial
knowledge of system specifics, whereas ICSREF does not
require any a priori knowledge.
The proprietary, closed-source JEB decompiler for S7
PLCs by PNF Software performs similar operations to the
reverse engineering analyses of ICSREF, but targets binaries
for Siemens controllers [37]. It can disassemble and decompile
MC7 programs for Siemens S7 PLCs, where MC7 code is
essentially proprietary bytecode interpreted by a runtime on
Siemens PLCs. The disassembler/decompiler was developed
after its authors manually reverse engineered the Stuxnet pay-
load. In comparison, ICSREF targets binaries for CODESYS
PLCs, providing to ability to reverse engineer additional tar-
gets. ICSREF is in contrast open source, with its modular
design allowing it to be easily extended for other architectures
and formats, including Siemens MC7 bytecode.
Related work also includes general purpose multiplatform
decompilers, such as the state-of-the-art Hex-Rays Decom-
piler [19] and RetDec [27]. In general, decompilers can recre-
ate a higher level representation of given machine code and
could be useful for performing analyses of PLC binaries simi-
lar to the ones performed by ICSREF. We tested the capability
of both the Hex-Rays and RetDec decompilers to analyze our
database of PLC binaries and neither provided useful results.
As mentioned above, this stems from the differences between
IT and OT, which hinder the direct translation of IT techniques
to OT scenarios [34]. In contrast, the structured methodology
we follow in developing ICSREF is aware of the specifics
and conventions used, allowing ICSREF to successfully reverse
engineer the same binaries.
Regarding ICS analyses, at a higher abstraction layer than
ICSREF, operating directly on IEC 61131-3 source code, the
work in [45] parses the source code, generating a list of po-
tential vulnerabilities and proposes associated design patterns
to remove them. For attacks on PLC source code, the authors
of [15] introduce the concept of “ladder logic bombs”, which
instantiate PLC malware written in IEC 61131-3 languages. At
a lower abstraction layer than ICSREF, [5] describes firmware
modification attacks against PLCs, with proof-of-concept ex-
periments against Allen-Bradley PLCs. Also at the firmware
level, [14] presents HARVEY, a physics-aware rootkit against
PLCs that can meaningfully manipulate control commands
at the firmware, realizing adversary-optimal attacks. The im-
plementation details of pin control operations in embedded
systems are exploited in [2], for instantiating stealthy attacks
against a PLC and taking control of the physical process it
regulates. All these works assume either full or partial prior
knowledge of the target process. In contrast, ICSREF does
not require any a priori knowledge of either the operations
performed by a PLC binary, or of the physical environment it
regulates. Nevertheless, ICSREF can be used in conjunction
with these techniques to enhance their analyses, as it can
automatically extract the required contextual information.
Although ICSREF is not a disassembler but a more general
framework tailored to PLC binaries, a rough comparison can
be made between it and more generic disassembler frameworks
that also allow scripting, such as IDA Pro. We considered
developing ICSREF as a set of plugins for IDA Pro, but
chose to opt for an open source stand-alone framework that
can be used openly and freely without requiring an IDA
license. Besides its open source nature, ICSREF differs from
IDA in that it is a cross platform framework. ICSREF is
entirely implemented in Python for portability, and our case
study in the previous section, where we deployed ICSREF
on a commercial ARM-based smartphone demonstrates the
cross-platform benefits of our choice. Furthermore, having
full control of the development process and the selection
of dependencies and software libraries in conjunction with
our modular design for ICSREF, enables easy interchange
of ICSREF’s underlying mechanics and operation. For ex-
ample, ICSREF users can easily swap radare2 with an
other disassembler, or Graphviz with another visualization
software. In addition, the modular nature of ICSREF allows it
to handle platform modifications and updates by the respective
platform vendors in a robust manner. Adopting a structured
methodology in implementing our framework allows us to
easily capture modifications in the supported platforms and
update ICSREF with the corresponding knowledge.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this work we propose a structured methodology for
automating the reverse engineering process of PLC binaries,
taking into account the unique characteristics inherent in
PLC binaries. Using this methodology, we develop ICSREF,
our modular automated ICS reverse engineering framework.
ICSREF can automatically analyze PLC binaries created using
CODESYS, one of the three major software platforms for
ICS. It can fully reconstruct the CFG of any given CODESYS
binary in an automated fashion, and carry out typical reverse
engineering tasks independent of vendor, PLC model, and IEC
61131-3 language. For evaluating the correctness of ICSREF
we create a database of PLC programs including both source
code and binaries, which can be studied and further used as
benchmarks by the community. The automated capabilities of
ICSREF enable a broad scope of analyses, such as dynamic
payload generation which we demonstrate in our end-to-end
case study. Our future work consists of enriching the capabil-
ities of ICSREF with additional modules performing common
reverse engineering tasks and extending ICSREF knowledge
bases to additional platforms and hardware architectures.
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